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DIRECTIVES and NORMS

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CONTENTS

Preface *page* ix

I Introduction

1 *Traditionally a distinction has been made between 'theoretical' and 'practical' discourse. It remains undecided, however, what the subject of this distinction is, and what is its foundation* 1

2 *Speech is the concrete linguistic phenomenon. A speech-act is* (1) *a phonetic sequence* (2) *of correct syntactic structure* (3) *with semantic meaning and* (4) *pragmatic function* 3

3 *Indicative and directive speech are distinguished. It is the aim of this study to explicate the concepts 'directive' and 'norm' on the basis of this distinction, and to help lay a foundation for deontic logic* 7

I Indicative Speech

4 *The phrase is a linguistic figure which expresses the idea of* (*or describes*) *a topic* 9

5 *A sentence in indicative discourse is a linguistic figure expressing a proposition* (*an indicative*), *which is the idea of a topic conceived as real* 12

6 *Accepting or rejecting a proposition as true or false is a soliloquistic act which has an adjudicative function* 15

7 *Asserting a proposition is an act of communication with an informative function, by virtue of the basic norm of communication* 19

8 *'Posing' a proposition is a speech-act which has a fabulating function* 29

III Directive Speech

9 *A sentence in directive speech is a linguistic form which expresses a directive, that is, an action-idea conceived as a pattern of behaviour* 34

10 *The class of directives called 'personal' includes as a subclass 'speaker-interested' directives, which include* (1) *sanctioned commands and invitations,* (2) *authoritative commands and invitations, and* (3) *sympathy-conditioned requests* 38

11 *Personal directives which are hearer-interested include advice, warnings, recommendations, and directions for use* 44

12 *Personal directives which are disinterested are called exhortations or admonitions* 47

13 *Directives which are impersonal and heteronomous are called quasi-commands. They include* (1) *legal rules; and* (2) *conventional rules (conventional morality, courtesy and decency)* 48

14 *Directives which are impersonal and heteronomous-autonomous include the rules of games and similar arrangements founded on agreement* 53

15 *Impersonal directives which are autonomous comprise the principles and judgments of personal morality* 57

16 *Acceptance is a soliloquistic act whose function is adjudicative. It occurs only with regard to the autonomous directives of morality. According to the non-cognitive view, acceptance is constitutive* 61

17 *Directives are normally used in communication by advancing them with directive function* 68

18 *The fundamental difference between indicative and directive speech is to be found at the semantic level. This difference conditions corresponding pragmatic distinction of function, and is related to standard differences at the grammatical level* 69

19 *The distinction between indicative and directive speech is not exhaustive* 74

IV The Concept of a Norm

20 *From the point of view of the social sciences a norm is to be defined neither merely as a linguistic phenomenon (the meaning content which is a directive) nor merely as a social fact* 78

21 *A norm is to be defined as a directive which corresponds in a particular way to certain social facts* 82
22 *Comments in further explanation of the concept 'norm'* 92

V An Analysis of the Elements of a Norm
23 *According to how the subject of a norm is determined a distinction is made between individual and universal norms. A norm is individual if its subject is determined as a closed class, by the use either of genuine proper names or of descriptions which are combined with an indication of time* 106
24 *According to how the situation is determined by the norm, we distinguish between occasional norms and rules. Rules are either hypothetical or categorical* 111
25 *According to how the theme of the norm is determined, we can distinguish between rigorous and discretionary norms* 112
26 *Chains of norms. Commands and prohibitions* 113
27 *In a formalized language the directive operator is expressed by the word 'obligation'. In legal language a number of other derivative modal expressions are used. Von Wright's assertion that 'permission' cannot be defined as the negation of obligation is disputed* 116
28 *Comments on the table of legal modalities* 124
29 *It is possible to interpret the legal modalities in such a way that they have, to some extent, an application to non-legal normative discourse* 135

VI Deontic Logic
30 *The fact that norms (directives) are without truth-value does not rule out the possibility of deontic logic* 139
31 *In indicative logic external and internal negation are equivalent* 143
32 *In deontic logic external and internal negation are not equivalent. Internal deontic negation is different from the corresponding indicative negation* 150
33 *External and internal deontic disjunction are not equivalent. Internal deontic disjunction is different from the corresponding indicative disjunction* 158
34 *External and internal deontic coniunction are presumed to be equivalent and analogous to indicative conjunction* 163
35 *External and internal deontic implication are not equivalent. Mixed values occur in the value-table of internal deontic implication* 164

36 *Psychological interpretations of deontic logic: Ross* (1941) *and von Wright* 168

37 *Following Weinberger, the principles of deontic logic are interpreted as postulates defining directive speech. 'Validity' is not on an equal footing with 'truth' but is derived from the concept of 'acceptance' common to both ramifications of logic* 177

38 *Deontic logic immediately concerns O-expressions (directives). It has, however, derivative consequences for the corresponding F-expressions* 182

Index 185